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D.STATEMENT OF CASE 
Respondent was the legal wedded wife of the Appellant 
for 7% years.(T109,R009, R014) December 1968 to July 197 6. 
Respondent was the Common Law Wife of the Appellant 
for another 6% y ears thereafter (T23,24) July 1976 to end of 
1983. "The formal payment of $200 a month child support was 
made in 1984. (T150) (See also T 150 to 153)" 
Respondent is mentally handicapped with a functional 
level I.Q. of 92 (T92) "which is in the low normal range on the 
I.Q.Scale (T44)" "The low range is 90 to 110 (T44)" "She was in 
an 11 year or 12% year level on arithmetic itiems (T46)1 She's 
functioning at 14.8 years (T35)" "I found her mental age based 
on Psychological testing to be 14 years eight months, which falls 
at the lower end of the normal range (T60)" "In items which are 
most demanding of concentration, she only went to a 12% year leve 
(T60)" "What about her arithmetic or mathematics? She was 
able to perform between 11 years and four months and 12% years. 
(T60)" "He gave her an I.Q. of 73--composite I.Q. of 73.(T64)" 
"My opinion is that she would have difficulty functioning above 
a menial level, yes--She would have difficulty functioning 
indepentently in Society. (T67)" "She is not able to function 
indepentently to earn a living and to furction independently in 
society (T68)" "She's not sufficiently mature or emotionally sta 
to have gainful employment in society.(T81)" 
Appellant seeks and alleges that a substantial change 
of circumstances has occurred that makes it manditory upon the 
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Court to modify the Divorce Decree to force the Respondent to give 
to the Appellant possession of the home and divest herself 
of the Life Estate that she has therein.(T132) Appellant in his 
pleadings admits and alleges that even though the plaintiff's 
income increased since the Decree, so has his obligation to 
support others which has increased with his new wife, and his 
new baby.(T144, T145) "The reason we are here in Court, there 
has been a substantial change since the date of the Decree. One, 
that Charles Hagen has less of a net income now than he had.(Tl45)ff 
"I am here because I cannot afford to support Linda Hagan in 
the manner which I supported her over the last 13 years (T146, 
T147)" "Linda was not employed in 1976 when you started the 
Divorce action, was she?" Answer. "NO. she was not (T147)" The 
Appellant earned in 1975 the sum of $29,329. (See T142). The ap-
pellant earned in 1988 a net income profit of $50,000.(See T19 
and 143). 
The Appellant admits that he is not presently impoverished. 
"I am not impoverished" (T146). 
That the Respondent was a good mother "of course" (T150) 
That the Respondent was an adequate mother. "Yes" (T150) 
and "I am here because I cannot afford to support Linda Hagen in 
the manner which I supported her over the last 13 years" (T146) 
That it has been stipulated before the Court that the 
Appellants attorney fees incurred to be $£500, and the Respondents 
attorney fees incurred to be $3590. (See T194). 
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E. MISCHARACTERIZED AND MISTATED FACTS 
Mischaracterized and Misstated Facts and Response 
to Appellants Brief. 
Eage 16 of Appellants Brief. 
Appellant earned in 1975 $29,329 (T142). 
Appellant earned in 1988 $50,787. (T19 and 143). 
(Claims new wife as change of circumstances 
expense but new wife earns $20,000 for tax 
write off. (T19)l 
Page 16. Linda Hagan has never paid child support (T86) 
never ever asked for in pleadings. See 
Allegation 7 of Appellants Petition. lfI do not 
intend to seek child support from defendant11. 
(R018). 
Page 17. The case of Owen v. Owen, 734 P2 414 (Ut 86) 
is cited: The facts in that case do not remotely 
match or control the facts before the Court 
in this appeal. 
Page 18. The case of Cart er v. Carter, 19 Ut2 183 (Ut 67) 
is not in point: The issue before this 
Court in the case is not an issue of the children 
but very well could be a matter of spousal 
support and the well being of a handicapped 
-£--
exspouse. 
Page 19. The case of Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 131 UAR 28 
(ut90). In this case an equity was payable under 
delineated conditions and a Life Estate was 
not awarded the wife in the Whitehouse case. 
Judge Moffat found nothing was ambiguous and 
if ever there was such, the ambiguity would 
have to be resolved against the Appellant who 
enjoyed the fruits of paying $100 a month 
child support money to the Respondent for his 
children. In this divorce Decree,in th^case, 
the child support money of $100 a month per child 
was spelled out and the obligation to pay the 
Utility payments to Linda Hagan is certainly in 
the nature of spousel support, and as such the 
Court should, under its equitable powers and 
the facts of this case, granted the Respondent's 
request for Modification and Respondents Cross-
Appeal should be granted. 
Page 20. The fact that respondent no longer has her two 
sons now 17 and 19 years of age residing with 
her was certainly contemplated by the Court when 
the Divorce was granted. The Court also must 
have contemplated that if the home was to be 
awarded to Respondent for life with remainder 
there to the Appellant that the utilities would 
need to be paid after the children were gone. 
-L-
Representations are made that Appellants income has 
decreased. This simply is not true. 
Page 21. The apartment referred to was on the property at the time 
of the divorce and Respondent had to remodel the same to 
be able to rent. Appellants allegations that Linda Hagan 
is very capable of employment is not true while the 
appellant has a new helpmate wife who he pays $$0,000. a 
year from his own business while also paying for boats, 
vehicles and other assets. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS ARGUMENT POINT 1: 
The Appellant Father and Husband, knew the Decree permitting 
the respondent Mother and Wife to live at the residence was for so 
long as the Respondent Wife", subject to the right of the defendant 
to reside in the said property so long as she desires". (See para-
graph 4 of Divorce Decree). (R014) "A judgment must be enforced as 
written if the language is clear and unambiguous". (See Park City 
v. Ensign Co., 586P2 446, 450(Ut 1978); also, Felt v. Felt, 27 
Ut2 103 (Ut 1972). The Court at the time of the Divorce did certainly 
assume and did contemplate that the children would someday grow up 
and leave their mother, and at such time the mother would still 
desire to live at the residence where she had been a slave to the 
children for payment of $100 a month child support money assistance 
from the wedded husband of 7 years, and was his Commonlaw wife 
thereafter from July 1976 to 1984, when the parties, did not file 
for the first time as husband and wife a joint Federal and State 
Income Tax. Legal and Common-law marriage from 1968 to 1984, 
(See T213 and T114), a period of 16 years during which time the 
Respondent was a devoted Mother is hardly justification to force 
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her now to give up her "desire" to "reside" as set forth in 
conclusion of Law No. 4."The right of the defendant to reside in 
said property so long as she desires". (R011) 
RESPONSE OT APPELLANTS ARGUMENT POINT II. 
The appellant cites Owen v. Owen, 734 P2 415) (1986) which 
is a "Under the facts of this case", and the facts therein do not 
conform to the facts in this case now under appeal. 
The Appellant cites Carterv. Carter, 19 Ut2 183 (67) which 
does not even remotely support the Appellants contentions herein 
that he should be entitled an equitable right to force the 
Respondent to lose forever as Judge Moffat so aptly observed "the 
divorce Decree provided a property interest in that home". (For the 
wife, not the children). "It's a remainder interest". "It's a Life 
remainder—a Life Estate so long as she wishes to hold on to it". 
(Bet the Appellant does not wish to give up his fee title interest 
in the home to the Respondent under the equitable power of the 
(Court). (See T 216-217) "First of all, I find that that's a property 
ownership interest with a fee title in the plaintiff, and a Life 
Estate for something in the nature of a Life Estate in th e 
Defendant". (T217) "Further, th ere hasn't been such a change of 
circumstances that I (the Court) would be willing to find that the 
Petition of the plaintiff to sell the home (worth $196,000 in 1979. 
See T 127-128) and to remove the defendant would be justified under 
the circumstances". (See T 218) "There is no evidence whatsoever 
before me that the defendant is capable of earning an income". 
(See T 218). But currently, I regard her as unemployable". (See T218). 
"The situation will remain Status Quo". (See T 219). 
-£• 
Appellant further cites Whitehouse v. Whitehouse 131 UAR 
28 (1990) which held that the trial Court improperly reformed the 
Divorce Decree to eliminate condition in division of marital home. 
Further, holding that the Trial Court may not substitute 
its Judgment for stipulated property disposition.The Whitehouse 
case is a good case for the Respondent and certainly does not support 
the Appellant's contentions whatsoever that Judge Moffat was 
obligated, as a matter of law under the fact of this case, that 
Judge Moffat must grant the Appellants Petition because Judge 
Moffat must find as a fact that the Appellant "has demonstrated 
that there has been "a substantial change of circumstances occur-
ring since the entry of the Decree and not contemplated in the 
Decree itself'1. (Citing Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P2 707 (Ut 85) also, 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P2 365(ut 88). 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS ARGUMENT POINT III, the Rental Property. 
The rental property was restored rental that the defendant 
paid for.(Tl03). Sometimes it has been empty for six* months at a 
time. (T104). Appellant verified "was there an apartment located 
at this resident?" Answer: "Yes, there was." (T115) "Separate from 
the residence Linda lives?" Answer: "Yes. " "Is that apartment, 
to your knowledge, rented out since 1976?" Answer: "I understand 
it has been", (T116) "I get money from my apartment." 
Q."And that apartment, who helped remodel that, or who paid the 
money to remodel it?" 
ANSWER: "My mon and dad did." T190). 
Q. "Did you help supply money to Linda (daughter) to remodel the 
rental unit that she has at the house?" ANSWER: "Yes" (T210) 
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Q. "You and your husband paid the money out to have it done, to 
make it habitable; would that be a correct statement?" 
Answer:"Making it so that she could have a renter" (T211). The 
restoration of the rental property under the facts of this case 
certainly does constitute a betterment to the Appellants Fee title 
interest in the property, and Appellant has no basis for complaint 
for a capital improvement to his vested property interest. The 
apartment existed when the divorce was granted and Respondent, under 
her "Life Estate" status is entitled to proceeds from the rental 
thereof. (See Bettinger v. Bettinger, 134 UAR 20 (1990). 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS ARGUMENT POINT IV. 
This argument point is certainly frivilous and is made in 
"bad faith". Allegation 7 of the Appellants Petition to Modify (R018) 
provides "I do not intend to seek child support from defendant (R018) 
Appellant is bound by his pleadings. Further, the Respondent is 
not gainfully employed and is in need of spousal support herself. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS ARGUMENT OF POINT V. 
There being no Point V in Appellants Brief it is impossible 
to respond thereto. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS ARGUMENT TO POINT VI. 
There is no fourth condition as the appellant contends. Judge 
Moffat addressed this argument correctly and directly; 
THE COURT: "Well, my ruling is going to be that the Decree, when 
it talks about the defendant,upon receipt of $15,000, executing a 
Deed, and so on, giving it to the plaintiff is contingent upon 
her exercising one of her options". "That is, to remarry, or 
move from the home or the property is sold". (See T 11). 
F. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
F. In this case the trial Court found no substantial changes had 
occurred since the entry of the divorce Decree which was acquired 
by the Appellant by default from a medically mentally handicapped 
woman with an IQ of 14^ year old woman; who was not represented 
by counsel, and yet has abided and been used by the Appellant for 
years past under the terms and conditions set forfth in the Divorce 
papers prepared and submitted by the Appellant to the Court, 
The bottom line is as Judge Moffat sets forth at Page 218 
of (T218) . lfThere hasn't been such a change of circumstances that 
I would be willing to find that the Petition of the plaintiff to 
sell the home and remove the plaintiff, would be justified under 
the circumstances11. (T218). 
The second bottom line is there are no compelling reasons 
to grant the Appellants Petition to sell the home and remove the 
respondent wife therefrom. Appellant received exac tly what he 
bargained for, and the fact that he has now remarried and has two 
of his children born Wyatt in 1970, and Wesin 1973 now residing 
with him must have been contemplated^a possible future occurrance 
by the Court granting to the Appellant a questionable default 
divorce, is simply not a change of circumstances upon which the 
trial Court may modify the Divorce Decree. (See Woodward v. Woodward 
709 P2 393 (Ut 85). For this Court to rule otherwise would open 
a Pandora's Box permitting parties to a divorce to seek subsequent 
modification of property settlements every time either party 
decided to get remarried and every time a teenager decided to reside 
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with a different parent. "Equity is not available to reinstate 
rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because 
one has come to regret the bargain made."''Accordingly, the law 
limits the continuing jurisdiction of the Court where a property 
settlement agreement has been incorporated into the Decree, and 
the outright obligation of the provisions of such an agreement 
is only to be resorted to with great reluctance and for compelling 
reasons". See: Jense v. Jense, 784 P2 1249 (Ut 89) citing Land 
vs. Land, 605 P2 1248 (Ut80). 
The Appellants remarriage and present care of two children 
one now is 19 years old and the other is 17 years old, are not a 
change of circumstances upon which the original award to the 
respondent a Life Estate in the property/%she resides in and the 
Appellants vested remainder interest therein.Cjfi At )f*i d*f* t***9 
Lastly the Respondent is entitled to be awarded attorney 
fees in this matter. Respondent was prepared and commenced to prove 
her legal and reasonable attorney fees incurred and Appellant did 
in Open Court before Judge Moffat stipulate as follows: 
Mr. Zager: "Again, for the interests of the Court, George 
Searle showed me $3200 for his attorneyfs fees. Mine was $2500. 
If we want to go ahead and stipulate that those are the attorney's 
fees, I have no problem with that". 
Mr. Searle: "flat's fineM. 
The Court: "Very well". 
Mr. Searle: "That was before the Trial yesterday. There 
- / t -
is jf60 added to that, thats $60 an hour, for six hours for 
yesterdays trial'1. 
Mr. Zager: ff We stipulate to it.You don't have to make 
it an Exhibit11. 
Mr. Searle: "Doesn's matter, I don't care. Its stipulated 
your Honor, thats my attorney fee, as of the end of yesterday, 
was $35$0." 
MR. Zager: "Trying to move this along a little bit. 
Mr. Searle:" I'll agree. I'll stipulate that his attorney's 
fees are $2500. 
The Court:" Very Well. Stipulations are conclusive and 
binding on the parties unless good cause is demonstrated warranting 
relief therefrom.(See Hidley v. McDonald, 685 P2 496 (84(1). The 
financial condition and needs of the Respondent spouse are such 
that her financial condition is that she is not gainfully employed 
and not capable to be gainfully employed. Respondent certainly 
did need legal assistance and without it the Appellant would have 
her in the street.Respondent has no money or means to pay her • 
necessary legal fees. (2) The Respondent with a 14 yearQld I«Q« 
level does not have the ability to produce a sufficient income 
for her own needs let alone means to pay necessary incurred legal 
expenses. (3) The Appellant with a net yearly income in excess 
of $50,000 a year has the ability to provide and pay the 
Respondents Attorney fee incurred in protecting herself 
A R G U M E N T 
Respondent has been taken advantage of by the Appellant 
- / : ? 
without mercy since before the Divorce. The Respondent needs help 
and the Appellant should be obligated to provide it. The oldest 
boy is 19 years of age and the youngest is 17 years of age. 
Respondent through no cause or fault of her own has been victimized, 
hasT been a good mother, and has been an adequate mother. She should 
be honored and appreciated, not ridiculed and prepared or forced 
to go on welfare. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Appellants appeal in this matter should be dismissed, 
and Respondents Cross-Appeal should be granted with attorney fees 
and costs of Court assessed against the Appellant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS day of June, 1990. 
ty for 'Respondent and Cross-
Appellant. 
2805 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Tele 466-8656 
Received a copy this day of June, 1990. 
